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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HUEY L. DEPEW 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DENTON C. SULLIVAN, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 20010242-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78-2-2 (3)0') (1998). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court err in refusing to direct a verdict against the 
defendant on the issue of his negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout and in failing 
to yield the right-of-way? (R 441-45; 498 at 348-49) 
Standard: In reviewing the denial of motions for a directed verdict and for a new 
trial, the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom the motion was made. In reviewing a trial court's exercise of discretion 
upon a motion for a new trial, the reviewing court examines the record to determine 
1 
whether the evidence supporting the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust See McCloud v 
Baum, 569 P 2d 1125 (Utah 1977) 
Issue No 2 Does the evidence support the jury's finding that 100% of the 
negligence causing the subject accident should be attributed to the plaintiff? (R 498 at 
348-49) 
Standard A jury verdict is reviewed in a light most favorable to the verdict See 
Child v Gonda, 972 P 2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998) 
Issue No 3 Did the trial court err in allowing Officer Stacy Richan to offer an 
opinion regarding the speed of plaintiffs motorcycle7 (R 498 at 277) 
Standard Rulings regarding the admissibility of expert testimony are reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard See Gerbich v Neumad Inc 977 P 2d 1193, 1196 
(Utah 1999) 
Issue No 4 Did the trial court en in refusing to allow plaintiff meaningful vou 
dire during jury selection7 (R 497 at 34-38) 
Standard Rulings made in the course of voir dire are reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard See Barrett v Peterson 868 P 2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct App 1993) 
Issue No 5 Did the trial court err in imposing sanctions against plaintiffs 
counsel7 (R 310-11, 321-22) 
Standard A trial court has broad discretion to select and impose sanctions for 
discovery violations See Pennington v Allstate Ins Co 973 P 2d 932, 940 (Utah 1998) 
An abuse of such discretion is demonstrated when there is no evidentiary basis for the 
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trial court's ruling See Morton v Continental Baking Co 938 P 2d 271, 274 (Utah 
1997) 
Issue No 6 Did the trial court err in awarding costs for videotape depositions and 
for depositions not used at the time of trial9 (R 439-40) 
Standard A trial court's award of Rule 54 costs is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard See Hull v Goodman 290 P 2d 245 (Utah 1955) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN § 41-6-73 Vehicle turning left - Yield right-of-way 
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall yield the right-of-
way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is so 
close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto m 
the form of an opinion or otherwise 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Proceeding. This appeal is from a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and 
against plaintiff entered in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, the 
Honorable James L Shumate presiding and from an order denying plaintiffs motion for 
new trial 
Course of Proceedings in Lower Court. Plaintiff sued defendant for special and general 
damages arising from personal injury suffered in a motor vehicle accident 
During litigation of the case, defendant filed a motion to compel answers to certain 
discovery requests This motion was not supported by affidavit or evidence nor did 
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defendant's motion seek sanctions against plaintiffs counsel. Nevertheless, the trial 
court entered an order assessing defendant's attorney fees against plaintiff and his 
counsel. 
At the close of the evidence plaintiff moved the court to direct a verdict against the 
defendant on the issue of his negligence. The trial court denied the motion and the cause 
was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories. 
Disposition in the Lower Court. The jury, by a vote of seven-to one, returned special 
verdicts finding defendant guilty of no negligence and attributing 100% of the fault to 
plaintiff. Thereafter plaintiff moved for a new trial on the grounds that the jury's findings 
were not supported by the evidence. The trial court denied the motion and entered 
judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The motor vehicle accident which gives rise to this action occurred in the early 
evening of May 21, 1996. (R 498 at 81-82, 258) Plaintiff was driving a motorcycle in a 
southeasterly direction down a slight grade on Bloomington Drive East in the city of St. 
George. (R 498 at 321-23) Defendant was driving a pickup truck in a northwesterly 
direction on the same roadway intending to make a left turn into the driveway of his 
grandparents' residence. (R 498 at 285-86, 288) 
Bloomington Drive East is a two-lane road. Although the public right-of-way is 
considerably wider, the pavement is only approximately 24 to 28 feet wide, each lane 
being approximately 12 to 14 feet in width. (R 498 at 291) The posted speed limit is 25 
miles per hour. (R 498 at 260) 
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The accident occurred at about one hour before sunset. (R 498 at 181-182) 
Weather and road surface conditions were not a factor, nor was there any other vehicular 
or pedestrian traffic in the area. Plaintiff conceded that he may have been traveling as 
fast as 30 to 35 miles per hour. (R 497 at 85-86, 498 at 265-66) 
Defendant's view of plaintiff was intermittently and partially obstructed by a curve 
in the road and vegetation as plaintiffs motorcycle approached from the northwest 
Howevei, defendant's view of the plaintiff was full and continuous from and after the 
time plaintiff reached a point 430 feet from the estimated point of collision. (R 498 at 
184-88) 
When plaintiff was something less than 140 feet from defendant, the defendant 
turned left in front of him.1 
Defendant does not claim to have misjudged plaintiffs speed or distance. He 
testified that he simply did not see the plaintiff when he executed the left turn. (R 428) 
He reported seeing "a white flash" out of the corner of his eye a moment before the 
collision, apparently after he was already in plaintiffs lane of travel. (R 498 at 260, 287) 
'Defendant's expert offered no opinion regarding plaintiffs distance at the time 
defendant executed his left turn. The distance of 140 feet is calculated based on the 
position of defendant's vehicle at the time of the collision (R 498 at 88-89) and assumes 
that plaintiffs motorcycle was traveling at the maximum speed that defendant's own 
expert witness attributed to that vehicle (R 498 at 282) and further assumes that the speed 
of plaintiff s motorcycle was not reduced by plaintiffs braking prior to the collision. 
These assumptions serve to extend the estimated distance between the vehicles at the time 
the defendant executed his left turn. 
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The collision occurred in plaintiffs lane (R 498 at 289) The front of his 
motorcycle struck the passenger side of defendant's truck somewhere near the rear wheel 
(R 498 at 88-89) 
At trial, defendant, who was serving an L D S mission, testified via videotape 
deposition and attempted to excuse himself by proving thai the plaintiff was traveling at 
an excessive rate of speed To that end, defendant called the police officer who had 
originally investigated the accident to testify as an expert witness (R 498 at 256-285) 
Officer Stacy Richan testified that he had been called to the location of the accident on 
the evening in question and had attempted to establish the plaintiffs speed primarily by 
reference to the length of a single skid made by plaintiffs motorcycle (R 498 at 261-82) 
On voir dire Richan conceded that at the time he made his investigation of the 
accident scene he was not familiar with the principles of physics that govern the 
calculation of the speed of a motorcycle (R 498 at 275-76, 291-92) He also conceded 
that he had since learned that there is a marked difference between calculating the speed 
of a motorcycle as opposed to calculating the speed of an automobile because a 
motorcycle has separate brakes for the front and rear wheels (R 498 at 276, 292-93) 
Richan further conceded that he had since learned that 70 percent of the motorcycle's 
stopping power is provided by the front wheel and 30 percent by the rear (R 498 at 300) 
Unaware of this fact at the time of his physical investigation at the scene of the 
accident, Richan had concerned himself with a single skid mark which he determined was 
41 feet m length (R 498 at 261, 284, 308-09) He had made no attempt to determine if 
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both the front and the rear tires skidded for that distance being, at the time, unaware of the 
importance of this factor. 
Using his newly acquired knowledge of motorcycle accident reconstruction, at trial 
Officer Richan proposed to offer an opinion regarding plaintiffs speed based upon an 
assumption that both wheels skidded a distance of 41 feet, one skid having been laid 
perfectly over the top of the second with one exception. (R 498 at 261, 293-96, 308-09) 
Richan recalled having seen two distinct skid marks which ran side by side for a distance 
of two or three feet near the end of the skid. (R 498 at 293-94, 296) This was the only 
evidence he observed that indicated both wheels had been locked in a skid at any point in 
time. Under further questioning by plaintiffs counsel it became apparent that Officer 
Richan did not understand that it is impossible to steer and control a motorcycle for any 
appreciable distance with the front wheel locked in a skid. (R 498 at 297-99, 304-06) 
Over plaintiffs objection (R 498 at 277-81), Officer Richan was allowed to testify 
that in his opinion the plaintiff had been traveling at somewhere between 40.93 mph and 
46.08 mph. (R498at282)2 
After both parties had rested, plaintiff moved the court to direct a verdict against 
the defendant on the issue of defendant's negligence leaving to the jury the comparison of 
any negligence it might find on the part of the plaintiff. (R 498 at 348-49) The court 
denied plaintiffs motion (R 498 at 349) and submitted the case to the jury on special 
2Compare McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Utah 1977), where a 
motorcyclist traveling at a speed of 30 mph left 50-foot skid mark. 
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interrogatories with the following instructions concerning the plaintiffs and defendant's 
respective duties 
Instruction 36 One who has the right-of-way has the immediate privilege 
of proceeding while others must yield If a driver operating a vehicle has 
the right-of-way, the drive may rely on the right-of-way until something 
warns to the contrary The driver cannot rely on the right-of-way 
heedlessly, but must continue to exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances 
R 498 at 361 
Instruction 42 The driver of a vehicle turning left must yield to vehicles 
close enough to represent an immediate hazard However, a driver is not 
compelled to remain in a street indefinitely waiting to turn into a driveway 
The driver must make reasonable observations and yield when reasonably 
necessary 
R 498 at 363 
By a vote of seven-to-one, the jury found the defendant free of any negligence and 
attiibuted the entire fault for the accident to the plaintiff (R 369-71) The court entered a 
judgment in accordance therewith (R 432-35) 
Thereafter, plaintiff moved the court for a new trial on the grounds that the 
evidence did not support a finding that the defendant was free of all negligence (R 441-
45) The court denied the motion (R 457-59) and plaintiff appealed (R 462-63) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant offers no justification or excuse for his failure to yield the right-of-way 
to the approaching plaintiff The defendant was negligent as a matter of law Because the 
defendant was guilty of some negligence and that negligence was a proximate cause of 
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plaintiffs injuries, the jury should have allocated at least some fault to defendant. Where 
it failed to do so, the case must be remanded for a new trial. 
Whether or not defendant's purported expert would have been qualified to 
investigate a motorcycle accident at the time of the trial and render an opinion with 
respect thereto is irrelevant where he concededly did not possess the requisite expertise to 
gather and preserve all the material physical evidence at the time of his investigation of 
the accident in question. 
Plaintiffs requested voir dire regarding any affiliation prospective jurors may have 
had with LDS missionaries was relevant under the circumstances of this case and was 
properly restricted in its scope. The district court erred in refusing to allow plaintiff 
meaningful voir dire during jury selection. 
Attorney's fees are properly assessed against counsel as a sanction under Utah 
R.Civ.P. 37 only when it is clear that discovery was unjustifiably opposed principally at 
counsel's instigation. The record does not support the imposition of such a sanction 
against plaintiffs counsel. 
The lower court erred in awarding defendant the costs of depositions without 
reference to whether or are not such were used at trial and where the video deposition in 
question was taken strictly for the defendant's convenience. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A VERDICT 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ON THE ISSUE OF HIS NEGLIGENCE 
AND IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
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Section 41-6-73 of the UTAH CODE provides: 
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall yield the right-of-
way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is so 
close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
While the violation of a statute does not necessarily constitute negligence per se, it 
is regarded as prima facie evidence of negligence, subject to justification or excuse. See 
Intermountain Farmers Ass fn v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162,1164-65 (Utah 1978) (quoting 
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62, 64 (1964)). See also, Gaw v. 
State Utah, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977), the plaintiff sued to recover 
damages for personal injury sustained in an intersection collision. The issues of liability 
and damages were submitted to a jury which found in favor of the defendant and 
judgment was entered accordingly. Plaintiff appealed contending that the trial court erred 
in denying plaintiffs motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, or for a new trial. 
In that case the plaintiff was driving a motorcycle in an easterly direction 
following a truck with a camper attached. As the camper approached an intersection 
which was controlled by a flashing yellow light for east-west traffic, the driver signaled a 
left turn. The plaintiff testified he was approximately 30 feet behind the camper. The 
defendant was operating her vehicle in a westerly direction on the same street. She 
stopped at the same intersection to make a left turn. The defendant was unable to see the 
plaintiff following the camper because the plaintiff had maneuvered his motorcycle to the 
edge of the traveled portion of the roadway in anticipation of passing the camper on the 
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right as the camper executed its left turn. Both the camper and defendant proceeded into 
the intersection at approximately the same time to execute left turns. The evidence was 
conflicting as to whether the camper was stopped or moving in the intersection at the time 
of the collision. The plaintiff passed to the right of the camper and collided with the rear 
portion of defendant's vehicle as the defendant turned left. The defendant testified that 
the plaintiff swung out and around the camper. 
In concluding that the trial court had not erred in denying plaintiffs motion for a 
directed verdict, the Utah Supreme Court quoted from Klinzing v. Huck, 45 Wis. 2d 458, 
173 N.W. 2d 159, 163-164 (1970), and noted: 
If a person, in making a left turn whether at an intersection or 
a private driveway, in front of an oncoming vehicle, makes 
the turn at a time when he cannot safely do so without danger 
of a collision, he is negligent. The important factor in this 
negligence is that he makes the turn without an efficient 
observation that he can complete the turn without collision. 
It is incorrect, however, to reason from the fact of collision to 
the conclusion that there must have been negligence on the 
part of the left-turning driver. . . . 
The court further observed that what is reasonable safety depends upon the 
facts in the particular case. An inference of negligence does not arise from 
the fact of collision alone involving a left-turning driver. 
Under the particular facts of this case, reasonable minds could differ as to 
whether defendant exercised due care in executing a left turn. Defendant did 
not observe any traffic following the camper; the travelled portion of the 
single lane of opposing traffic was occupied by a slow moving vehicle; she 
did not anticipate a vehicle moving onto the shoulder of the road and 
passing the camper on the right through an intersection controlled by a 
flashing yellow light. Plaintiff does not contend defendant should have 
remained stationary until the camper had completed its turn. He merely 
contends there was some optimum vantage point within his lane of travel 
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where defendant should have stopped and observed him. The trial court properly 
submitted the issues of defendant's asserted negligence to the jury 
569 P 2d 1127-28. 
Clearly, a different scenario is represented here In the instant case, the defendant 
had an unobstructed view of the approaching plaintiff and offers no justification or excuse 
for not seeing him. A driver who fails to see what is obviously there to be seen and 
consequently fails to yield to another who is favored over him is guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law and a verdict establishing such negligence is properly directed against him. 
See Mitchell v Resting, 221 Neb. 506, 378 N.W 2d 188 (1985), Davis v Phillips, 215 
Neb 184, 377 N.W.2d 754 (1983). Indeed, it is error to refuse to direct a verdict on the 
issue of such negligence See Diers v Van Diest Supply, 1992 NE 357 
<http //www.versuslaw com>, 1 NCA 1099. 
In Smith v Johnson, 183 Ariz. 38, 899 P.2d 199 (Ariz App.1995), the defendant 
sought to justify or excuse his failure to yield the right-of-way on the grounds that as the 
plaintiff was approaching the intersection where the collision occurred, the driver of a 
third vehicle who apparently had an unobstructed view of the intersection waved to 
defendant to go ahead and make his left turn. The jury returned a verdict for the 
defendant. On appeal the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that defendant's reliance 
upon a third party's act assuring him that the coast was clear did not excuse defendant's 
failure to yield the right of way. Inasmuch as the facts also presented issues concerning 
plaintiffs comparative negligence, the court went on to conclude 
We therefore hold that the only reasonable Conclusion the jury could have 
reached was that defendant was negligent in making his turn and that his 
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negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries. Accordingly, the 
verdict was required to have ascribed at least some fault to defendant. Since 
it did not, it was contrary to the weight of the evidence and the motion for 
new trial should have been granted. 
W , at If 68. 
In Diers v. Van Diest Supply, supra, the plaintiff was driving an automobile 
northbound on a four-lane highway, approaching an interchange with Interstate 80. The 
defendant was traveling southbound on the same highway, driving a cab-over semi with 
trailer. It was defendant's intention to turn left onto the eastbound ramp to Interstate 80 
He testified that he signaled a left turn, entered the left-turn lane of the southbound lanes, 
and gradually reduced his speed to 10 miles per hour before actually beginning execution 
of his left turn. He further testified that he looked south for oncoming traffic upon 
entering the left-turn lane and again before proceeding to turn left. He never saw 
plaintiffs vehicle approaching from the south. As he turned, he looked back to make 
sure his trailer was clearing the median. Thereafter, he "saw a flash" of something to his 
right and felt the impact of plaintiff s vehicle as the cab of his truck was crossing the right 
lane of the northbound part of the highway. 
After both parties had rested, the plaintiff moved for the court to either direct or 
instruct the jury that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law, with the comparison 
of negligence to be left for the jury. The court denied the motion and refused the 
instruction. The case was submitted to the jury on the issues of negligence, comparative 
negligence, and damages. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff 
then moved the court to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff notwithstanding the 
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veidict or, in the alternative, for a new trial The motion was denied 
In reversing the lower court, the Nebraska Court of Appeals noted 
The law is clear that the defendant should have refrained from making a 
left-hand turn until he could do so with reasonable safety and that he was 
required to yield the right-of-way to any vehicle which constituted an 
immediate hazard 
In Mitchell v Resting, 221 Neb 506, 378 N W 2d 188 (1985), a northbound 
motorist made a left turn and was immediately struck by a southbound 
pickup truck The northbound motorist sued, and the trial court sustained a 
defense motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the case The Nebraska 
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, quoting the rule 
that '"it is established law that a driver who fails to see another who is 
favored over him is guilty of negligence as a matter of law "' Id at 508, 
378 NW 2d at 190 
In Mitchell, as in the present case, the issue for the trial court was whether 
or not the approaching vehicle was located in a favored position Factors 
considered by the Supreme Court included testimony of witnesses as to the 
location of the approaching vehicle at the time of impact, the location of 
skid marks, the location of debris from the collision, testimony of an 
accident reconstruction expert, and the fact that no evidence was presented 
to show that the oncoming vehicle was not in a favored position In 
Schanaman v Ramirez, 206 Neb 212, 292 N W 2d 39 (1980), the court 
relied on the location of the impact to establish that the plaintiffs decedent 
was approaching the intersection and was so close as to constitute an 
immediate hazard 
Applying the factors enumerated in Mitchell and Schanaman, and giving 
the defendant the benefit of every inference which can reasonably be 
deduced from the evidence, there is nothing in the case at bar to suggest that 
the plaintiffs vehicle was not in a favored position The day was sunny 
and clear, and visibility to the south of the collision site was good 
However, the [defendant's] own testimony was that even though he looked 
to the south twice before turning, he failed to see the plaintiffs vehicle He 
stated that perhaps he had failed to see the plaintiffs vehicle because when 
he looked it had been "below that knoll," a rise in the pavement south of the 
point of impact We are required to accept as true that defendant's driver 
looked twice and still did not see the plaintiffs oncoming vehicle 
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Photographs show that the intersection was virtually unobstructed, except for the 
presence of two road signs in the median opposite the [defendant]. However, even 
the [defendant] stated that he did not think the signs obstructed his vision, and it is 
somewhat puzzling on appeal that the defendant asserts this as a possible 
explanation of why its driver did not see the plaintiffs oncoming vehicle. If the 
[defendant's] view was obstructed by the road signs, he was obligated to use 
reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid a collision, and he was negligent 
as a matter of law to proceed into the intersection without ascertaining what, if 
anything, was hidden from view behind the signs. See Schenk v. Yosten, 229 Neb. 
691, 428 N.W.2d 510 (1988). 
The Supreme Court stated in Mitchell, supra: 
"He is not absolved from liability by a failure to see what he could have seen by 
the exercise of due diligence, but is chargeable with seeing what he should have 
seen. He is also chargeable with seeing that which is apparent or in plain view, 
with seeing that which he could have seen had he looked, and with knowledge of 
all that a prudent and vigilant operator would have seen. His failure to see that 
which he should have seen constitutes as much negligence as though he had not 
looked at all . . ." 
Id. at 509, 378 N.W.2d at 191, quoting 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 284(3) 
(1969). 
Construing all the evidence in favor of the defendant, it is clear that the 
defendant's truckdriver did not see what was obviously there to be seen. 
The plaintiff was in the favored position, and the [defendant] failed to yield 
the right-of-way before commencing his left-hand turn. We find that the 
defendant was therefore negligent as a matter of law and that the court 
should have granted the plaintiffs motion to direct a verdict on the issue of 
the defendant's negligence. 
1992.NE.357 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 1 NCA 1099, ff 25 - 34 (emphasis added) . 
Cf Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 495, 498 (1949) (mere glance by 
pedestrian in the direction of an approaching automobile does not amount to compliance 
with duty, since inherent in duty to look is the duty to see what is there to be seen and to 
pay heed to it). 
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In the instant case the defendant offered no justification or excuse for his failure to 
yield the right-of-way to the approaching plaintiff Defendant does not claim to have 
misjudged plaintiffs speed or distance He testified that he simply did not see the 
plaintiff before executing his left turn There is no justification or excuse in this 
explanation of his conduct The defendant was negligent as a matter of law Because the 
defendant was guilty of some negligence and that negligence was a proximate cause of 
plaintiffs injuries, the jury should have allocated at least some fault to defendant Where 
it failed to do so, the case must be remanded for a new trial See Smith v Johnson, supra 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING OFFICER STACY 
RICHAN TO OFFER AN OPINION REGARDING THE SPEED OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTORCYCLE 
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that a witness who has been qualified as an 
expert may testify "if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fad in issue " Utah R Evid 
702 
As a general rule, it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether 
a particular expert is qualified and whether particular testimony would be helpful and 
suitable in a particular case See Ostler v Albina Transfer Co ,781 P 2d 445, 447 (Utah 
Ct App 1989) A party who challenges a ruling concerning the admission or exclusion 
of expert testimony must demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion See 
Gerbich v Neumad, Inc , 911 P 2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1999) 
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Concededly, an expert witness is not unqualified to testify on the subject matter 
simply because he or she had not attained his or her expertise at the time of the 
substantive event. See Grindstaffv. Coleman, 681 F.2d 740, 743 (11th Cir. 1982) (expert 
permitted to testify regarding standard of care in medical community in 1969 
notwithstanding the fact that he did not possess expertise at that point in time). This rule, 
of course, presupposes that all material facts and circumstances as they existed at the 
relevant time have been preserved and can be made known to the witness after he or she 
attained the expertise necessary to formulate a meaningful opinion. 
On voir dire Richan conceded that at the time of his investigation he was not 
familiar with the principles of physics that govern the calculation of the speed of a 
motorcycle. (R 498 at 275-76, 291-92) He further conceded that there is a marked 
difference between calculating the speed of a motorcycle as opposed to calculating the 
speed of an automobile. (R 498 at 276, 292-93) 
While investigating the accident in question, Richan concerned himself with a 
single skid mark. (R 498 at 261, 284, 308-09) He made no attempt to determine if both 
the front and the rear wheels skidded for the entire length of the observable skid. 
Richan was allowed to offer an opinion regarding plaintiffs speed based upon an 
assumption that both wheels were skidding the entire 41-foot length of a single skid mark. 
(R 498 at 261, 293-99, 304-06, 308-09) This was not only rank speculation, it was 
speculation made years after the physical examination of the scene of the accident. 
No conscientious expert in the field of motorcycle accident reconstruction would 
venture an opinion regarding the speed of plaintiff s motorcycle based upon the 
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information Officer Richan gathered and preserved in his report. A copy of the officer's 
report is attached hereto as Addendum A. Throughout his testimony, Officer Richan 
repeatedly indicated that he recognized the Traffic Accident Investigation Manual; At 
Scene Investigation and Technical Follow-up. (Northwestern University Traffic Institute) 
as authoritative. (R 498 at 270-71-78, 298-99, 307-08) At page 18-3 of that work we 
read the following: 
Vehicles such as motorcycles, tractors and trailers may have no brakes on 
some wheels or may have brakes which are applied separately to some 
wheels. In stopping these vehicles, therefore, some wheels may contribute 
little or no drag and so must not be considered as fully sliding unless all 
wheels leave definite skid marks. 
Emphasis added. 
Although Richan acknowledged this caveat (R 498 at 307-08), he steadfastly 
refused to concede that plaintiffs speed might properly be calculated on any premise 
other than both wheels in a full skid for the entire length of the 41-foot skid mark. 
Whether or not Officer Richan would have been qualified to investigate a 
motorcycle accident at the time of the trial and render an opinion with respect thereto is 
irrelevant where he concededly did not possess the requisite expertise to gather and 
preserve all the material physical evidence at the time he made his investigation of the 
accident in question. 
When, through objection, plaintiff identified this concern in the trial court, the 
court simply concluded: 
THE COURT: Counsel, the measurements didn't change, the coefficients 
didn't change. The training and experience of the witness may have 
changed, but you haven't gone to those changes or experience of the 
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witness changes. He's talking about today. Anything specific on voir dire 
for today. 
R 498 at 277. 
This completely misses the point. To allow this officer to render an opinion and to 
thereby invite the jury to rely thereon is analogous to expecting a physician to render a 
diagnosis based upon a physical examination made by a third party who did not have the 
training or experience necessary to appreciate everything he should have been looking 
for. Clearly, such a practice would not be tolerated in the medical profession. The 
question is whether or not it will be tolerated in the legal profession. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF 
MEANINGFUL VOIR DIRE DURING JURY SELECTION. 
When this matter came on for trial, defendant was serving a mission for the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints on the East Coast and planned to present his 
testimony by way of video-taped deposition. (R 244-54; 428; 498 at 339) For this reason 
plaintiff asked that prospective jurors be required to disclose any affiliation they may 
have with LDS missionaries and to indicate whether any potential jurors had served an 
LDS mission. (R 498 at 34-38) The court refused to permit voir dire on this subject 
stating that "religious affiliation has nothing to do with jury service." (R 497 at 35) 
Plaintiff does not contend that a prospective juror's religious beliefs may constitute 
grounds for his disqualification to serve, nor was the requested voir dire calculated to 
reveal jurors' religious beliefs. It was intended as a means of determining which 
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prospective jurors, as a result of their association or experience, might tend to relate to or 
sympathize with the defendant. 
In State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
emphasized that "voir dire examination has as its proper purposes both the detection of 
actual bias and the collection of data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory 
challenge" (citations omitted). If defense counsel had intended to explain his client's 
absence by disclosing that the defendant was presently overseas on active duty with the 
United States military, clearly an opposing party would be entitled to know if a 
prospective juror had a family member in a similar circumstance. 
In State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), the defendant was convicted in a jury 
trial of driving under the influence of alcohol. During voir dire the trial judge asked the 
veniremen whether any of them had "prejudices against people that drink." No one 
responded in the affirmative. Defense counsel later asked the court to inquire as to 
whether any of the veniremen chose "not to drink for any reason." In response to this 
inquiry four veniremen indicated that they not drink, whereupon the following exchange 
then occurred: 
[Defense Counsel]: May we inquire of [the four jurors who indicated they 
do not drink] whether that is for a personal conviction or a religious one? 
The Court: I don't-I don't think that's proper to ask. They say they choose 
not to drink, and I think that's sufficient. 
[Defense Counsel]: May we inquire of the four of them whether that 
predisposition or attitude about alcohol-
The Court: I don't think those questions are proper, Counsel, and I never 
ask them. You're entitled to know those that drink and not drink, the 
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reasons for doing so is personal and in fact, there is some question about 
whether that comes within the Constitution as to religious convictions and 
disqualification, because of that, so I don't ask the questions. I won't ask 
questions in that area. I never have, sir, and I just won't. I think it's 
something that's precluded by the State Constitution. 
A/., at 1056-57. 
On appeal, the defendant contended that the circuit court had erred in restricting 
defense counsel's questioning of prospective jurors on voir dire. In reversing the 
conviction on that ground, the Utah Supreme Court observed that following: 
The question of whether the juror's abstention was "for a personal 
conviction or a religious one" has only a minimal relationship to the 
constitutional language regarding incompetence of jurors because of 
"religious belief or the absence thereof." The mere asking of the question 
has nothing to do with competence to serve, that is, with a juror's basic 
qualifications to participate in a panel. Age (in adults), gender and 
occupation likewise may not be used to render an individual incompetent as 
a prospective juror, but an exploration of the attitudes and convictions that 
may exist in a person who belongs to those groups is certainly permissible 
to aid in discovering actual bias or prejudice relating to the subject matter of 
a particular case. For example, an individual could not be challenged for 
cause and eliminated from a jury panel on the basis of race. But if his 
attitudes in a criminal prosecution, which were related to his experiences 
respecting race, were such as to preclude him from acting impartially, a 
challenge would lie. Religious beliefs, unlike gender or race, are not 
readily apparent, and their existence, if directly related to the subject matter 
of the suit (as they may be in a case involving alcohol consumption), must 
be determined by preliminary inquiry. Should those religious beliefs (or the 
absence thereof) be the basis for actual bias, prejudice, or impartiality, a 
challenge for cause would likewise lie. In that event, an individual would 
not be declared "incompetent... on account of religious belief in violation 
of the constitution, but rather unfit to serve in a particular cause because of 
actual prejudice. The fact that actual bias or prejudice is related some way 
to an individual's religious beliefs does not preclude exclusion for 
demonstrated inability to serve as an impartial juror. 
M,at 1057. 
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The court concluded that "the question of one's competence for jury service 
generally is a separate question from the issue of one's potential lack of impartiality in a 
particular case." Id., at 1058 
In Ball, the state further contended that, since none of the jurors, in response to the 
court's general inquiry, had indicated that they had any biases or prejudices, defendant's 
proposed further inquiry was superfluous. The supreme court responded with the 
following: 
That position suggests an unwarranted naivety regarding human nature. 
The most characteristic feature of prejudice is its inability to recognize 
itself It is unrealistic to expect that any but the most sensitive and 
thoughtful jurors (frequently those least likely to be biased) will have the 
personal insight, candor and openness to raise their hands in court and 
declare themselves biased. Voir dire is intended to provide a tool for 
counsel and the court to carefully and skillfully determine, by inquiry, 
whether biases and prejudices, latent as well as acknowledged, will interfere 
with a fair trial if a particular juror serves in it. 
Id. 
With this observation the court went on to note that ihe ruling at issue also 
"reflects inadequate deference to the function of peremptory challenges in our system of 
jury trials." Id. 
Properly utilized, . . . the peremptory challenge performs a valuable 
function in our jury system. Its efficacy is necessarily vitiated when a party 
is not permitted to gather enough information from prospective jurors in 
order to exercise his right intelligently. . . We view the question asked 
here by defense counsel as being reasonably calculated to discover any 
latent bias that may have existed among the four veniremen who stated that 
they did not drink; the information sought, even if it would not have 
supported a challenge for cause, would have allowed defense counsel to 
exercise his peremptory challenges more intelligently. 
Id, at 1059-60 
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It requires little imagination to understand why the plaintiff in the instant case 
wanted to know whether any of the prospective jurors had any affiliation with an LDS 
missionary or had themselves served such a mission The defendant was likely seen as 
one who had been placed at something of a disadvantage in being required to defend a 
civil proceeding without the benefit of being able to attend the tnal because he elected to 
answer a higher call To suggest that an affiliation with an LDS missionary would have 
no potential for impacting upon one's sympathies is to "suggest[] an unwarranted naivety 
legarding human nature " 
Plaintiffs requested voir dire was relevant and properly restricted in its scope 
Clearly, the district court erred in refusing to allow plaintiff meaningful voir dire during 
jury selection 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL 
On February 22, 1999, defendant moved the district court to compel plaintiff to 
respond to certain discovery requests (R 82-84) This motion was not supported by 
affidavit or evidence nor did defendant by this motion seek sanctions against plaintiffs 
counsel Following a hearing on April 7, 1999, the court denied defendant's motion (R 
258) At a hearing conducted on May 12, 1999, defendant asked the court to reconsider 
his motion to compel (R 295) Following oral argument, the court revised its earlier 
ruling and "order[ed] that all documents that show damage to the [plaintiff be] given to 
counsel [for defendant] within 30 days " (R 295) At that time the court did not rule on 
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defendant's request that sanctions be imposed upon the plaintiff, taking that matter under 
submission. 
On June 21, 1999, the district court, without further hearing entered a pleading 
captioned "Revised Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery and for 
Sanctions." (R 305-309) In that ruling, the court concluded that "[u]nder Rule 37(d) 
sanctions are justified without reference to whether the unexcused failure to make 
discovery was wilful." (R 307) Based upon plaintiffs admissions that the requested 
documents were in fact in his possession, the court concluded that attorney fees and 
expenses incurred in filing the motion to compel should be granted. (R 307) 
Accordingly, the district court concluded that "Defendant's request for sanctions against 
Plaintiff is hereby granted." (R 308) The court further instructed defendant's counsel "to 
prepare an affidavit of costs and expenses incurred by the bringing this motion, and 
submit it to the Court within 15 days of the date hereof." (R 308) 
On or about July 8, 1999, counsel for the defendant submitted an affidavit 
claiming $822.25 in attorney fees and expenses. (R 312-15) In addition thereto 
defendant's counsel submitted the form of an order for the court's signature which 
purported to award the defendant $822.25 in attorney fees "against plaintiff and his 
counsel." (R316) Emphasis added. This proposed order was submitted to the court for 
signature without first being served upon plaintiffs counsel as required by Rule 4-504(2), 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Consequently, it was signed and entered by the 
court before plaintiffs counsel had an opportunity to object thereto. (R 321-22) 
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When plaintiffs counsel objected to the entry of the order, the district court 
overruled his objection and allowed the order to stand as entered (R 337-38) 
While, in the appropriate circumstance, attorney's fees may be appropriately 
assessed against counsel as a Rule 37 sanction, courts have imposed such a sanction only 
where the attorney has had "a high degree of culpability " See Crawford v American 
Fed n of Gov't Employees, 576 F Supp 812, 815 (D D C 1983) A lawyer cannot 
always control the actions of a client, and it would be unfair to hold the lawyer 
accountable for them, unless it appeared that he or she had some responsibility for the 
client's recalcitrance See Inter-Trade, Inc v CNPq-Conselho Nacwnal De 
Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnologico, 761 A 2d 834 (D C 2000) An award is 
properly made against the attorney "only when it is clear that discovery was unjustifiably 
opposed principally at his instigation " Humphrey's Exterminating Co v Poulter, 62 
F R D 392, 395 (D Md 1974) Accord\ Inter-Trade Inc v CNPq-Conselho Nacwnal 
De Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnologico, supra (vacating order assessing attorney's 
fee against counsel for defendant where there was no evidence establishing that 
defendant's failure to appear for deposition was based upon the advice of counsel) 
There is nothing in the record suggesting that any failure to provide timely 
discovery can or should be attributed to the actions, neglect, or oversight on the part of 
plaintiffs counsel Moreover, if the defendant intended to seek some form of sanction 
against counsel personally, counsel was entitled to notice and an opportunity to defend 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COSTS FOR 
VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITIONS AND FOR DEPOSITIONS NOT USED AT 
THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
Upon entry of the judgment, defendant filed a Memorandum of Costs seeking 
costs in the amount of $2511.65 for depositions taken in this case. (R 436-38) In so 
doing, he failed to identify the individual depositions with respect to which he sought an 
award of costs. (R 436) Moreover, defendant sought an additional $573.40 identified 
only as "Video deposition costs for depositions used at trial." (R 437) Over plaintiffs 
objection (R 439-40), the lower court awarded the defendant all such costs. (R 446-47) 
As a general rule, only depositions which are used at trial are properly included in 
an award of costs. See Nelson v. Newman 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978). Although 
defendant's memorandum of costs purports to identify only depositions which had been 
used at trial, the only deposition which defendant used at trial was his own video 
deposition taken for his convenience in order to facilitate his absence from the trial. 
Some jurisdictions have adopted the rule that unless otherwise stipulated to by the 
parties, the expense of video taping a deposition is to be borne by the party utilizing it and 
is not be taxed as costs. See Starling v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 22 S.W.3d 213 
(Mo.App. 2000). Other courts have adopted the rule that "[t]he reasonable expense of 
recording, editing, and using an audio-visual or tape recorded deposition may be taxed as 
costs." See Gilluly, v. Miller, 1995.MT.41 <http://www.versuslaw.com> (quotingRule 
30(h)(5), Montana R.Civ.P.). 
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The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contain no provision for the assessment of the 
costs associated with the production, editing, and using an audio-visual or tape recorded 
depositions. A deposition taken solely for a party's own convenience is not properly 
charged to the other party as part of the costs. See generally, Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 
165 Mont. 209, 527 P.2d 557 (1974). The video deposition in question was the 
defendant's own deposition taken for his convenience in order to facilitate his absence 
from the trial. Clearly, the costs associated with the recording, editing, or use of such was 
not properly charged to the plaintiff as part of the costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the forgoing it is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
district court must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 1st day of March, 2002. 
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